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Abstract
We describe the Monitoring and Checking (MaC) framework which provides assurance on the correctness of program execution at run-time. Our approach complements
the two traditional approaches for ensuring that a system is correct, namely static analysis and testing. Unlike these approaches, which try to ensure that all possible executions
of the system are correct, our approach concentrates on the correctness of the current
execution of the system.
The MaC architecture consists of three components: a lter, an event recognizer,
and a run-time checker. The lter extracts low-level information, e.g., values of program
variables and function calls, from the system code, and sends it to the event recognizer.
From this low-level information, the event recognizer detects the occurrence of \abstract" requirements-level events, and informs the run-time checker about them. The
run-time checker uses these events to check that the current system execution conforms
to the formal requirements speci cation of the system.
This paper overviews our current prototype implementation, which uses JAVA as
the implementation language and our Monitoring Script language as the requirements
language.
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1 Introduction
We develop a framework for run-time monitoring of correctness of real-time systems based
on a formal speci cation of system requirements. Computer systems are often monitored
for performance evaluation and enhancement, debugging and testing, control or check of
system correctness [Sch95]. Recently, the problem of designing monitors to check for the
correctness of system implementation has received increased attention from the research
community [CG92, SM93, ML97, Sch98]. Such monitors can be used to detect violations
of timing [ML97], a logical property of a program [CG92], a constraint on a language
construct [SM93], and so on.
The reason for increased interest in correctness monitors is that it is becoming more
dicult to test or verify software because software size is increasing and its functionality
is becoming more complicated. The most common way to validate a software system is
testing. However, testing cannot be used to guarantee that the system is error-free, since
it is infeasible to completely test the entire system due to the large number of possible
behaviors. Also, as the functionality and structure of software becomes complex in order to
satisfy a broad range of needs, testing itself needs to be sophisticated enough to check the
program according to diverse criteria. For example, for testing a numerical computation, it
is enough to check output with given input. However, when we test a real-time application
like trac control system, we also have to check the timing behavior.
Formal ver cation has been used to increase the con dence that a system will be correct
by making sure that a design speci cation is correct. However, even if a design has been
formally veri ed, it still does not ensure the correctness of an implementation of the design.
This is because the implementation often is much more detailed, and may not strictly follow
the formal design. So, there are possibilities for introduction of errors into an implementation of a design that has been veri ed. One way to overcome this gap between the design
and the implementation is to resort to testing the implementation's behavior on a set of
5

input sequences derived from the speci cation. This approach, however, su ers from the
same drawback as testing in general and does not provide guarantees about the correctness
of the implementation on all possible input sequences. Consequently, we cannot guarantee,
using the two traditional methods prior to the execution of the system, that its run-time
behavior will be correct. Therefore, the approach of continuously monitoring a running
system has received much attention.
In this paper, we describe a framework of monitoring and checking a running system
with the aim of ensuring that it is running correctly. The salient aspect of our approach
is the use of formal requirements speci cation to decide what properties to assure. Since
our goal is to check an implementation against requirements speci cation at run-time, we
assume that we are given both requirement speci cations and an implementation. To be
able to monitor satisfaction of requirements, we have to correlate low-level observations with
high-level notions used in the requirements speci cation. Therefore, the primary concern
of our presentation are the following two issues:




how to map high-level abstract events that are used in a requirement speci cation to
low-level activities of a running system
how to instrument code to extract necessary low-level activities.

The framework consists of the three phases: the design phase, the implementation and
instrumentation phase, and the run-time phase. During the design phase, the requirements
on the system are speci ed. Optionally, a formal system speci cation may also be written down and in this case we assume that veri cation is done to ensure that the system
speci cation satis es the requirements. During the implementation phase the system is
implemented. Based on the requirements speci cation and the implementation, the user
provides a monitoring script that contains instructions for instrumenting the code so that
low-level information about program state can be passed on to the monitor. In addition, it
6

also contains information that can be used to produce an event recognizer that transforms
this low-level information into high-level events.
Our run-time MaC architecture consists of three components: lter, event recognizer,
and run-time checker. The lter extracts low-level information (such as values of program
variables and time when variables change their values) from the running code. In order to
achieve this, we instrument the code of the system to be monitored. The lter sends this
information to an event recognizer. It is the job of the event recognizer to map this lowlevel information about the running code to high-level information that the run-time checker
understands. Based on the values of the monitored variables it receives from the lter, the
event recognizer detects the occurrence of events that are described in the requirement
speci cation, and sends them to the run-time checker.
The run-time checker then checks the correctness of the system thus far, according to
a requirement speci cation of the system, based on the information of events it receives
from the event recognizer, and on the past history. It checks the correctness of a sequence
of events seen by stepping through the requirements speci cation and the correctness of a
numerical computation by executing a program checker [BK95] for that function. This is
one of the main advantages that our approach o ers over other approaches to monitoring:
it provides an integrated framework to check general requirements both for control ow
during execution and for numerical computation.
The current prototype implementation of the MaC architecture, monitors programs
that are in JAVA bytecode and uses a new language called MEDL which is related to
linear temporal logic to describe the formal requirements. Although MEDL is used for
requirements speci cation, it is possible to use other formal languages like ACSR [BGLG93],
temporal logic, or Petri nets, by making only minor modi cations to the existing framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes related research.
Section 3 gives an overview of the MaC framework and discusses pertinent issues. Section 4
describes a prototype implementation of the MaC framework. Section 5 discusses example
7

applications that illustrate the use of our framework. Section 6 summarizes the presentation
and outlines furture work.

2 Related Research
Traditionally, veri cation and testing have been two approaches to trying to ensure the
correctness of a program. In formal veri cation, one describes both the requirements
and the system in some formal speci cation language, and then attempts to prove that
the formal speci cation of the system satis es the requirements. This \proof of satisfaction" can either be obtained using a model checker [CES86], which exhaustively checks for
satisfaction of the requirement in all possible computation scenarios, or using a theorem
prover [Gor88b, OSR93], where one shows that the requirement is a logical consequence
of the system speci cation. However, both model checking and theorem proving have limitations. The large size of the explicit representation of the state space of most systems
severely limits the size of systems that can be model checked. This is a problem referred
to as the state space explosion problem. Although state reduction techniques [Kur87] and
symbolic approaches [BCD+ 90, McM93] have been proposed to overcome the state space
explosion, fully describing and verifying a system is still hard. Theorem provers are dicult
to use as they, unlike model checkers, require extensive user interaction during proof construction. In addition, they su er from the fact that they cannot provide counter-examples
which show that the design is incorrect. Most importantly, even if some design has been
formally proved to be correct (using a model checker or a theorem prover), it does not mean
that the implementation is correct because often the implementation has greater detail, and
so is susceptible to errors not present in the design.
Testing attempts to overcome these problems by dealing with the implementation directly. Test cases are generated rst, and then the system is tested by checking sequences
of test inputs and outputs from testing. However, too many test cases are needed if one
8

wants to detect all faults with high probabilities. Thus it is dicult to use testing to ensure
the correctness of the system on all possible input sequences.
In order to overcome the limitations of both veri cation and testing, some researchers
have tried to systematically derive the implementation of the system from a formal speci cation [BCG87, Tur95] or generate test cases and oracles using formal speci cation [LY96,
JP97, CL97]. However, these approaches have their own limitations. Implementing the
system from a formal speci cation has problems of ineciency and incompleteness in a
sense that only skeleton code of the system can be generated and a human programmer
has to be involved to complete implementation, which could introduce errors. In addition,
most research on testing with a formal speci cation [JP97, SS97] focuses on black-box testing. However, the correctness of reactive programs depends not only on the input-output
behavior, but also on on-going interaction between components of the system.
Some researchers have, therefore, taken the approach of continuously monitoring the
current execution of the program to ensure compliance with behavioral and temporal requirements. The \behavioral abstraction" approach to monitoring was pioneered by Bates
and Wileden [BW83]. Although their approach lacked formal foundation, it provided a
solid foundation for future developments. The work of [DJC94] addresses monitoring of a
distributed bus-based system, based on a Petri Net speci cation. Since only the bus activity
is monitored, there is no need for instrumentation of the system. The authors of [SS97] also
consider only input/output behavior of the system. In our opinion, instrumentation of key
points in the system is needed to detect violations timely and reliably, without too much
performance overhead. In this spirit, the sentry system [CG92] observes the execution of
program and determines whether the program is behaving \correctly" with respect to a set
of speci ed logical properties on program variables. Sankar and Mandel have developed a
methodology to continuously monitor an executing Ada program for speci cation consistency [SM93]. The user annotates an Ada program with constructs from ANNA, a formal
speci cation language. But they can check only constraints on Ada constructs such as a
9

subtyping for Ada types. Mok and Liu [ML97] proposed an approach for monitoring the violation of timing constraints written in the speci cation language based on Real-time Logic.
Their goal is to be able to detect timing violations as early as possible with low overhead.
They describe how to derive a set of timing constraints for a given speci cation so that any
violation can be caught as soon as it happens by checking the constraints of such a set.
Our approach does not limit the scope of requirements to constraints on language construct
nor focus on timing constraints. We monitor general requirements described in a formal
speci cation. In the next section, we explain a run-time assurance monitoring architecture
as a solution to the above limitations of prior research. In [LC92], an elaborate language
for speci cation of monitored events based on relational algebra is proposed. The authors
distinguish between conditions and events, as we do. The goal is to minimize e ects of
instrumentation on run-time performance, and to reduce the instrumentation cost through
automated instrumentation.

3 The Monitoring and Checking (MaC) Paradigm
The MaC paradigm supports the run-time assurance monitoring of real-time systems. The
paradigm consists of three phases for system development and deployment as shown in
Figure 1: the design, implementation and run-time execution phases.

The design phase. In the design phase, we assume that the system requirements are

formally speci ed. In this phase, a system design may also be formally speci ed and veried against its requirements speci cation. Run-time assurance monitoring in MaC can be
applied both to a system with or without a formal speci cation. The requirements speci cation, however, must be given since it is the basis for run-time assurance. A formal
speci cation of the system may be helpful in mapping high-level events of the requirements
speci cation into the low-level system activities. However, the use of formal system speci10

Design
Phase

Implementation
Phase

Run-time
Phase

Static analysis

System
Specification

System
Implementation

System

Requirement
Specification

Monitoring
Script

Low level
Information
Filter

Event
Recognizer

Events
Run-time
Checker

Figure 1: Overview of the MaC framework
cation is not required by the MaC framework.

The implementation phase. In the implementation phase, the code for the system is

developed or derived from the design. Although there has been a progress in automating
the derivation of an implementation from a design speci cation, currently the derivation
for complex software produces at best skeleton code [SGME92, HLNP90] that must be
manually augmented to complete an implementation. This gap between a design and an
implementation in turn creates a gap between requirements and an implementation. The
goal of the MaC paradigm is to narrow this gap.
One source of the gap is that requirements are described often in terms of \high-level
events," while code uses only \low-level state" information about execution. In the rest of
the paper, we use \event" to denote \high-level event" and \state" for \low-level state." In
order to monitor and check required properties, the two types of information, i.e., events
and states, need to be related and their relations must be speci ed explicitly in a monitoring script. The monitoring script describes how events at the requirements level are
11

de ned on the monitored states of an implementation. For example, in a gate controller
of a rail-road crossing system, the requirements may be expressed in terms of the event
train in crossing; the implementation, on the other hand, only represents the train's
position with respect to the crossing in terms of a metric coordinate train position.
The monitoring script in this case can de ne the requirements event in terms of the value
of the (implementation) variable train position, for example as the time instant when
train position < 800.
The monitoring script is also used to generate a lter and an event recognizer automatically. A lter is a collection of code fragments that is used to instrument an implementation
to monitor necessary state information at run-time and an event recognizer determines the
occurrences of events using the information provided by the lter. We note that the monitoring script language depends on both the requirements and the implementation languages
used.
The major part of a monitoring script language is to de ne events. There is a tradeo
between the expressiveness of event de nitions and the run-time cost of event detection.
The language can be designed to allow very expressive event de nitions so that violation of
any requirements property is itself an event. However, the drawback of an expressive event
de nition language is the cost of event detection at run-time. In general, as the language
becomes more expressive, the granularity of detection needs to be ner, which incurs more
overhead in both time and space. However, if the language has limited expressiveness, it
cannot de ne some useful events. For example, if an event de nition language cannot express
ith occurrence of event, we cannot de ne 5th InCrossing of the train. We employ a twolevel approach that uses two languages, PEDL and MEDL (see Section 4.1). PEDL ensures
that we have an ecient lter and event recognizer, whereas MEDL provides expressiveness.
Furthermore, the implementation language speci cs are restricted to PEDL.
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The run-time phase. At run-time, the instrumented system is executed while being

monitored and checked against the requirements speci cation. As Figure 1 shows, during
execution the lter sends relevant state information to the event recognizer that determines
the occurrence of events. These events are then relayed to the run-time checker to check
adherence to the requirements. Our current system is geared towards the detection of faults.
It would be desirable in future to build monitors that can steer a system to correct states.

3.1 Filter
A lter is a set of program fragments that will be inserted into the implementation to instrument the system. The essential functionality of a lter is to keep track of monitored
objects, such as program variables and function calls, and to send pertinent state information to the event recongnizer according to the monitoring script. This part of the MaC
framework depends on the implementation language used. In addition, it must resolve the
following four issues.

When to instrument. The lter can be added to the implementation either statically or

dynamically. Static instrumentation means inserting the lter in the implementation before
the system is executed, whereas dynamic instrumentation involves inserting the lter in the
implementation at run-time. The advantage of dynamic instrumentation is exibility, for
example, where and what to insert can be determined at run-time based on the intermediate
result of the execution (e.g., [MC95]). However, it may incur extra overhead at run-time
to determine when it is safe to insert and remove lters. Also, it requires a complex
instrumentation mechanism. In our current prototype described in Section 4, we use static
instrumentation.

What to instrument. The lter can be inserted at the source-code level or the excutable-

code (e.g., bytecode) level. Compared to the source-code level instrumentation, the bytecode
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level instrumentation is complicated since the bytecode of a system does not have sourcelevel information useful for understanding the program. In addition, modifying a system at
excutable-code level requires modi cation not directly related to monitoring, but necessary
to keep the format of executable code consistent. The major advantage, however, is that
this executable-code level of instrumentation can be applied to a broad range of target
systems because executable code is always available for running a system. Especially in
mobile program environments it makes much sense. Mobile programs migrate in the network in executable-code form; although we may have source code, we have to instrument
a mobile program in the eecutable code. If we have some limited source-code level information on the system such as meanings and names of monitored variables and functions,
we can instrument the executable code of the system without complete access to the source
code. Another advantage of the executable-code instrumentation is that low level operations on executable code can provide ner granularity of observations and reliable detection
of changes in the program state. For the above reasons, our prototype instruments the
bytecode (i.e., executable code) of the system.

How to instrument. Instrumentation can be done automatically or manually. With

manual instrumentation, the user reads the source code of the program, then inserts lters
(or probes) into the system. This can be done eciently because it uses a heuristic and
domain knowledge to pinpoint where to instrument and what state information to extract.
However, its heuristic character may result in incompleteness. For assurance monitoring,
instrumentation should be complete in the sense that it should capture all interesting information. Missing information could lead to false or missed detection of faults. Automatic
instrumentation determines what lters/probes should be inserted where in a mechanical
way based on the de nition of the event and the structure of the program. The weak point
of automatic instrumentation is that it may not be easy to de ne an event of high level
behavior based on low level state information.
14

3.2 Event Recognizer
The event recognizer is the part of the monitor that detects an event from values of monitored variables received from the lter according to the event de nition in the monitoring
script (see Figure 1). Each time it recognizes an event de ned in the monitoring script, the
event recognizer sends it to the run-time checker. In addition to sending events, the event
recognizer may also forward variables' values to the run-time checker which uses them to
check certain types of requirements, e.g., a function computation.
While it is conceivable to merge the event recognizer with the lter, separating the
two modules is more advantageous: it shields the system execution from the overhead of
abstracting out events from low-level information. In other words, it minimizes interference
with the monitored system's execution. On the other hand, this architecture contains
communication overhead as the lter must send monitored variable changes to the event
recognizer. Additionally, implementation of the event recognizer as a module separate from
the lter allows us to monitor distributed systems by having a lter in each of the modules
of the system communicate with the central event recognizer.

3.3 Run-time Checker
The run-time checker checks that the execution thus far belongs in a set of all acceptable
behaviors, as de ned by the requirements speci cation. The nature of this set determines
the kind of assurance we may have about the correctness of the system. For example, if the
set of acceptable behaviors is a set of traces, then all we can say about an execution that
is \passed" by the run-time checker is that the sequence of events seen is correct. Another
possibility is to have the set of acceptable behaviors to be a set of timed traces. In this case,
it is possible to ensure not only the correctness of the system, but also its timing properties.
In Section 4.4, when we discuss the requirements speci cation language MEDL, we will
formally de ne the notion of a valid trace. The Trace Validity Problem, is a membership
15

checking problem to determine if a given trace is in the set of valid traces. For suciently
expressive requirements speci cation languages (such as a process algebra like ACSR) this
problem turns out to be NP-complete. Thus care should be taken in de ning this language
to make it expressive enough while still leading to a tractable trace validity problem. We
show that for MEDL the trace validity problem can be eciently solved.
The monitor can provide several kinds of formal guarantees of the system correctness.
If all the checking that is required is the validity of a trace in MEDL then the monitor
absolutely guarantees that the system behavior so far is correct. If the program uses numerical functions, the correctness of whose outputs is checked using the program checking
paradigm, then the guarantees on system behavior so far will be probabilistic. However,
the probability that the guarantee is incorrect can be made as small as we need. There
is a possibility that monitoring of a running system's behavior over suciently long intervals will allow us to provide statistical guarantees on the system itself and not just on its
behavior. This is a direction that we will explore in the future.
Another issue is unexpected events. Unexpected events are events which are not described in the requirements speci cation and thus not detected by the event recognizer. If
an unexpected event happens at run-time, the monitor may not see this event and consequently can make a wrong conclusion on the current execution of the system. For example,
let us assume that a requirements speci cation does not specify an event caused by arithmetic exception such as division by zero. When arithmetic exception happens at run-time,
which may lead to the system crash, the monitor might not detect that the current execution is incorrect because it does not receive an event of arithmetic exception, since it is not
de ned in the speci cation. Currently, we do not handle unexpected events, i.e., we assume
that unexpected events do not happen or these events do not in uence the correct execution
of the system. However, these have to be considered for providing complete guarantees.
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4 The Current MaC Prototype System
To evaluate the e ectiveness of the MaC framework, we are developing a prototype system
whose overall structure is shown in Figure 2. In this section, we rst describe our event
de nition language in which monitored properties are written. Then we explain the target
system to be monitored in the prototype and discuss three design issues related to the
implementation of the prototype. Finally, we discuss the lter, the event recognizer and the
run-time checker of the MaC prototype.
Informal Requirement Specification

Monitoring Script
Program(Java Source code)

-Monitored Variable Declaration
- Monitored Method Declaration

Human

- Event Definition

Program(Java Bytecode)

Human

Requirement Specification
- Functional Specification
-Temporal Specification

Filter Generator(Java program
using JTREK library)

Instrumented Program(Bytecode)

low level
information Event Recognizer
(Java program)

events

Run-time Checker

Legend
Input/Output

Process

Dependency

Run-time communication

Figure 2: The overall structure of the MaC prototype system

4.1 Event De nition Languages
In this section, we give a brief overview of the languages used in the current implementation
of MaC to describe what to observe in the program and the requirements that the program
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must satisfy. The scripts written in these languages are then used to generate the event
recognizer and the run-time checker, automatically.
The monitor observes a trace of the current execution of a program and checks that
it satis es the requirements. We distinguish between two kinds of data that make up the
trace of an execution: things that are true at some instant during the execution (which we
call events), and facts that hold for a longer duration of time (which are called conditions).
For example, the return from the method RaiseGate occurs only at the instant when the
control returns from the method, while a boolean condition like (position == 2) holds as
long as the variable position doesn't change its value from 2. Hence, in the monitoring
script language (PEDL, section 4.3) and the requirements speci cation language (MEDL,
section 4.4), we reason explicitly about both events and conditions. The distinction between
events and conditions is important in terms of what the checker can infer about the execution
based on the information received from the event recognizer. The checker assumes that truth
values of all conditions remains unchanged between updates from the event recognizer. For
events, the checker makes the dual assumption, namely, that no events (of interest) happen
between updates.
Based on this distinction between events and conditions, we describe a simple two-sorted
logic that de nes the various operations on events and conditions. PEDL and MEDL are
subsets of this logic with added de nitions of primitive events and conditions.

4.2 Logic for Events & Conditions
Syntax. We assume a countable set =
C

1 ; c2 ; : : :g of primitive conditions. For example,

fc

in the monitoring script language (Section 4.3), these primitive conditions will be Java
boolean expressions built from the values of the monitored variables. In the requirements
description language (Section 4.4) these will be conditions that were recognized by the event
recognizer and sent to the run-time checker.
18

We also assume a countable set = e1 ; e2 ; : : : of primitive events. When an event
occurs (to be de ned formally later), it can have an attribute value, which is an element of
a set e . For example, StartM(RaiseGate) is a primitive event in the monitoring script
language, which is present at the start of method RaiseGate and whose attribute value is
the tuple of values of all the parameters with which this method is called. The primitive
events in the requirements description language are those that are reported by the event
recognizer.
The logic has two sorts: conditions and events. The syntax of conditions (C) and events
(E) is as follows:
C ::= c [ E , E ) ! C
C && C
C
C
C
C
E ::= e start( C ) end( C )
E && E
E
E
E when C
E
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Semantics. The models for this logic are sequences of worlds, similar to those used for

linear temporal logic. Each world has a description of the truth values of primitive conditions
and occurrences of promitive events. More formally, a model M is a tuple (S; ; LC ; LE ),
where S = s0 ; s1 ; : : : ,  is a mapping from S to the time domain (which could be integers,
rationals, or reals), LC is a total function from S
to true; false , and LE is a partial
function from S
to e . Intuitively, LC assigns to each state the truth values of all the
primitive conditions. Similarly, in each state s, LE (s; e) is de ned for each event e that
occurs at s and gives the value of the primitive event e. The mapping  de nes the time at
each state, and it satis es the requirement that  (si ) <  (sj ) for all i < j , i.e., the time at
a later state is greater.
We now de ne what we mean by a condition c being true in model M at time t (M; t = c),
and an event e occurring in a model M at time t (M; t = e). The formal semantics of the
logic is given in Figure 4.2. The labels on states de ne the truth value of primitive events
and conditions. The semantics for negation (!c), conjunction (c1 &&c2 ), disjunction (c1 c2 )
and implication (c1 c2 ) of conditions is de ned naturally; so !c is true when c is false,
f

g
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j

jj

)
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M; t

j= ck (ck primitive) i

M; t

j= [e1 ; e2)

j=!c
M; t j= c1 jjc2
M; t j= c1 && c2
M; t j= c1 ) c2
M; t

i
i
i
i
i

j= ek (ek primitive) i
M; t j= start(c)
i
M; t

M; t

j= end(c)

j= e1jje2
M; t j= e1 && e2
M; t j= e when c
M; t

i
i
i
i

there exists state si such that  (si )  t and LC (si ; ck ) = true, and
for all states sj , if  (si ) <  (sj )  t then LC (sj ; ck ) is true,
i.e., ck is true at time t if its last assigned value was true.
there exists t0  t such that M; t0 j= e1 and for all t0  t0  t,
M; t0 6j= e2 , i.e., it is true since event e1 until event e2 .
M; t 6j= c.
M; t j= c1 or M; t j= c2 .
M; t j= c1 and Mt j= c2 .
M; t 6j= c1 or M; t j= c2 .

there exists state si such that  (si ) = t and LE (si ; ek ) is de ned.
9si such that  (si ) = t and M;  (si ) j= c and M;  (si?1 ) 6j= c.
i.e., start(c) occurs when condition c changes from false to true.
9si such that  (si ) = t and M;  (si ) 6j= c and M;  (si?1 ) j= c.
i.e., end(c) occurs when condition c changes from true to false.
M; t j= e1 or M; t j= e2 .
M; t j= e1 and M; t j= e2 .
M; t j= e and M; t j= c.
i.e., event e occurs when condition c is true.

Figure 3: Semantics of events and conditions.
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c1 &&c2

is true only when both c1 and c2 are true, c1 c2 is true when either c1 or c2 is true,
and c1 c2 is true if c2 is true whenever c1 is true. Conjunction (e1 &&e2 ) and disjunction
(e1 e2 ) on events is de ned similarly. Now, since conditions are true from some time until
just before the instant when they become false, two events can naturally be associated with
a condition, namely the instant when the condition becomes true (start(c)) and the instant
when the condition becomes false (end(c)). Any pair of events de ne an interval of time,
and forms a condition [e1 ; e2 ) that is true from event e1 until e2 . Finally, the event e when
c is true if e occurs and condition c is true at that time instant.
Notice that some natural equivalences that one might expect, hold in this logic. For
example, for any condition c, c [start(c); end(c)). This allows one to identify conditions
with pairs of events, and is the reason why the languages in the MaC framework, are called
\event de nition languages". Also, for conditions c1 and c2 , and event e, e when c1 when
c2
e when (c1 && c2 ).
jj

)

jj





4.3 Primitive Event De nition Language (PEDL)
The monitoring script in the prototype implementation is written in a language called
Primitive Event De nition Language, or PEDL for short. As stated earlier, PEDL is based
on the logic for events and conditions described in Section 4.2. There are two underlying
principles on which the design of this language is based. First, we would like to limit
all the implementation speci c details of the monitoring process to this language. Hence,
primitive events and conditions de ned in terms of methods and objects, are present only in
the monitoring script; requirement speci cation makes no references to methods and objects
of the program. Second, we would like the process of recognizing high-level events to be
simple i.e., events should be reconized based only on the current state of the program. Thus,
in this language we do not have logical operators that help reason about state sequences;
so the [ ; ) operation on events is not present in this language. Since it reasons only about
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the current state, we call it \primitive".

Structure of a PEDL script. The BNF grammar for PEDL is given in Figure 4. Every

PEDL script has an identi er (<MonScrID>), which is the name of the script. This is
followed by the lists of events and conditions that are \exported", i.e., the events and
conditions whose truth and falsity is reported by the event recognizer to the checker. The
monitored objects of the program are declared after the MonitoredObjects keyword, and
the methods under observation are declared after the MonitoredMethods keyword. Events
and conditions are de ned after this. As stated earlier they are built up from expressions
over the monitored object and methods. The script ends with the keyword End.

Monitored Entities. The user should be able to reason about any program object that

holds a value and thus forms a part of the program state, and any event that the program can
engage in. The former include individual variables and composite data structures (objects
in Java). The latter, at least for Java programs, includes only method calls and returns
(which also captures other activities, such as process creation and communication).
A PEDL script contains the names of all objects, methods, and local variables of methods
in the program that need to be monitored. The naming follows the standard Java convention
of using \." to move down in the class/object hierarchy. When naming methods we require
that the types of the arguments be speci ed. This is to help distinguish between overloaded
method names. Local variables are referred to by the name of the method, followed by \.",
and the name of the variable.
Note that, local variables in di erent invocations of a method correspond to di erent
entities, and so must be distinguished during recursive method invocations. However, this
requires the maintenance of an expensive stack at the event recognizer, to keep track of the
di erent values of the local variable. Hence, the default is not to distinguish between values
of local variables across method invocations. But if the user desires to distinguish between
22

/*-----------------Monitoring Script Declaration
-----------------*/
<MonScr> ::= MonScr <MonScrID><EventDcl><CondDcl><MonObjDcl>
<MonMethDcl><EventDef><CondDef> End
/*-----------------Event Declarations
<EventDcl> ::= export event <EventDcl'> ;
<EventDcl'> ::= <EventID> [ , <EventDcl'> ]

-----------------*/

/*-----------------Condition Declarations
<CondDcl> ::= export condition <CondDcl'> ;
<CondDcl'> ::= <CondID> [ , <CondDcl'> ]

-----------------*/

/*-----------------Monitored Object Declaration
------------------*/
<MonObjDcl> ::= MonitoredObjects : <MonObjDcl'> ;
<MonObjDcl'> ::=
<T> <Variable> ( , <Variable> )* | <T> <Object> ( , <Object> )*
| <MonObjDcl'> ; <MonObjDcl'>
/* <Variable>, <Object>, <Class> are Java identifiers for variable, object and class.
/*-----------------Monitored Method Declaration
<MonMethDcl> ::= MonitoredMethods : <MonMethDcl'> ;
<MonMethDcl'> ::=
<T> <Method> ( ; <T> <Method> )*

*/

------------------*/

(* <Method> is a Java method name along with types of parameters *)
/*-----------------Event Definitions
-----------------*/
<EventDef> ::= EventDef : <EventDef'>
<EventDef'> ::= Event <EventID> = <EventExp> { ; <EventDef'> }
<EventExp> ::= <SimpleEE> | <EventExp> <EventOp> <EventExp> | <EventExp> when <CondExp>
/*-----------------Condition Definitions
-----------------*/
<CondDef> ::= CondDef : <CondDef'>
<CondDef'> ::= Condition <CondID> = <CondExp> { ; <CondDef'> }
<CondExp> ::= <SimpleCE> | [<CondExp>] <CondOp> <CondExp>
/*-----------------Preliminary Nonterminals
------------------*/
<SimpleEE> ::= start (<CondExp>) | end (<CondExp>) | Update (<Variable>) | StartM (<Method>)
| EndM (<Method>) | IoM (<Method>)
<SimpleCE> ::= <BooleanExp> | InM (<Method>)
<BooleanExp> ::= Java Boolean Expression | <Exp> <CompOp> <Exp>
| [<BooleanExp>] <BoolOp> <BooleanExp>
<Exp> ::=
time (<EventExp>) | value (<EventExp>, <int>)
| any Java expression built from monitored objects & methods
<EventOp> ::= && | ||
<CondOp> ::= ! | && | ||
<BoolOp> ::= ! | && | ||
<CompOp> ::= < | <= | > | >= | == | !=

Figure 4: BNF Grammar for PEDL
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these values then he can append a \*" after the name of the local variable and this ensures
that during recursive calls, the local variable values are di erentiated. This actually, in a
back-handed way, allows the user to reason about the trace itself in the event recognizer.
The reason we allow it is because we want all program speci c information to be limited to
the PEDL script.
Also, since the lter must report all changes to monitored variables, it must also do so
when a monitored object is changed under an alias. For example, if a monitored object a
and another object b refer to the same object at run-time, then b also becomes monitored.
However, to detect such aliasing requires the lter to do expense book keeping at run-time.
So once again, the default is to only detect changes to objects made under the \monitored
names". The user can, however, force the lter to detect changes made through aliases by
appending a \*" to the name of the object.

De ning Events. The primitive events in PEDL correspond to instants in the execution

when control is transfered to and from a method or when a monitored variable is assigned
a value (not necessarily a new one). The following primitive events in PEDL correspond
these situations.
The event update(x) is triggered when the variable/object x is assigned a new value.
The value associated with this event is the new value of x. StartM(f) is triggered when
method f starts executing, and EndM(f) is triggered when control returns from method f.
The value associated with StartM is the tuple containing the values of all arguments. The
value of an event EndM is a tuple that has the return value of the method, along with the
values of all the formal parameters at the time control returns from the method. Besides
these three, we have one other primitive event which is IoM(f). This is also triggered when
control returns from a method f, but has as its value a tuple that contains the return value
of the method, and the values of the arguments at the time of method invocation. This event
allows one to look at the input-output behavior of a method, and is needed if one wants
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to program check some numerical computation. Notice once again, that this event IoM(f)
violates our second design principle, which is to limit the reasoning at the event recognizer
to be based only the values of the variables at the current state. IoM and local variables (see
paragraph on Monitored Entities) are the only exceptions to the second design principle,
and are present in PEDL only because these are program speci c.
All the operations for events described in the logic, can be used to construct more
complex events from these primitive events. In PEDL, we also have two predicates time
and value, de ned on events. time(e) and value(e) give the time and value associated
with the last occurrence of event e, respectively. Now, as we saw in the discussion on
the primitive events in PEDL, most of the events have a tuple of values associated with
them, i.e., value(e) is a tuple. Individual elements of the tuple can then be obtained via
a projection operation. We therefore, overload the name value(e,n), which gives the nth
element of the tuple value(e).

De ning Conditions. Primitive conditions in PEDL, are formed by boolean-valued ex-

pressions over the monitored variables. In addition to these, we have another primitive
condition InM(f). This condition is true as along as the execution is currently within
method f. Notice that, if there is no recursion, then InM(f) is the same as [ StartM(f),
EndM(f) ). However, if f is a recursive method, then InM(f) is true from the start of
the rst invocation till the end of the last invocation, and hence is not equivalent to [
StartM(f), EndM(f) ). While this is a desirable equivalence, we found that in most practical situations [ ; ), de ned the way we have in this document, is a more useful operation
on events. Thus we have a special primitive condition InM in PEDL.
Complex conditions are built from the primitive conditions using boolean connectives.
Pairing events (i.e. [ ; ) operation) to de ne conditions is not allowed in PEDL.
 

 

25

4.4 Meta Event De nition Language
The safety requirements that need to be monitored are written in a language called Meta
Event De nition Language, or MEDL. Like PEDL, MEDL is also based on the logic for
events and conditions, described in section 4.2. Events and conditions in MEDL are built
up from the events and conditions de ned in PEDL; hence the language has the adjective
\meta". MEDL also has auxilliary variables that may be used to record certain aspects of
the current trace, that cannot be described using the connectives of the logic.

Structure of MEDL script. The structure of a MEDL script is shown in Figure 5.

Once again, there is a name associated with the MEDL script, <ReqSpecID>. The list of
events and conditions, the checker expects the event recognizer to inform it about, is then
\imported" in <EventDcl> and <CondDcl>. The auxilliary variables are declared after the
keyword AuxilliaryVariables. These auxilliary variables may be used to store certain
aspects of the current trace, and their type must be one of the primitive Java types. The
events are conditions de ned after EventDef and CondDef are events and conditions that
are used to de ne the safety properties. The properties that the program needs to satisfy
is speci ed after this. The alarms are de ned after the keyword Alarms. Finally, the rules
for manipulation of auxiliary variables is given. The termination of the script is indicated
by End.

Auxilliary Variables. The logic described is section 4.2 has a limited expressive power.

For example, using the logical connectives described one cannot count the number of occurences of an event, or talk about the ith occurrence of an event. For this purpose, MEDL
allows the user to de ne auxilliary variables, whose values may then be used is de ning
events and conditions. These auxilliary variables, however, must be of one of the basic
types in Java. The update rules for these auxilliary variables take the form of guarded
commands. The antecedent of these guarded commands are events, while the consequent
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/*----------------Requirement Script Declaration
-----------------*/
<ReqSpec> ::= ReqSpec <ReqSpecID> [<EventDcl>] [<CondDcl>]
[<AuxVarDcl>] [<EventDef>] [<CondDef>]
[<SafePropDef>] [<AlarmDef>] [<AuxVarDef>] End
/*----------------Event Declaration
<EventDcl> ::= import event <EventDcl'> ;
<EventDcl'> ::= <EventID> [ , <EventDcl'> ]

-----------------*/

/*----------------Condition Declaration
<CondDcl> ::= import condition <CondDcl'> ;
<CondDcl'> ::= <CondID> [ , <CondDcl'> ]

-----------------*/

/*----------------Auxiliary Variable Declaraction
-----------------*/
<AuxVarDcl> ::= AuxilliaryVariables : <AuxVarDcl'> ;
<AuxVarDcl'> ::=
<T> <Id> ( , <Id> )* [ ; <AuxVarDcl'> ]
/*----------------Event Definitions
-----------------*/
<EventDef> ::= EventDef : <EventDef'>
<EventDef'> ::= Event <EventID> = <EventExp> { ; <EventDef'> }
/*----------------Condition Definitions
-----------------*/
<CondDef> ::= CondDef : <CondDef'>
<CondDef'> ::= Condition <CondID> = <CondExp> { ; <CondDef'> }
/*----------------Safety Property Definitions
-----------------*/
<SafePropDef>
::= SafetyProperties : ( property <SafePropID> = <CondExp> ; )+
/*----------------Alarm Definitions
-----------------*/
<AlarmDef> ::= Alarms : ( alarm <AlarmID> = <EventExp> ; )+
/*----------------Auxiliary Variable Definitions
-----------------*/
<AuxVarDef> ::= AuxVarDef : ( <EventExp> -> <Update> ; )+
<Update>
::=
<AuxVar(T)> := <Exp(T)> [ ; <Update> ]
/*----------------Preliminary Nonterminals
-----------------*/
<EventExp> ::= <SimpleEE> | <EventExp> <EventOp> <EventExp> | <EventExp> when <CondExp>
<SimpleEE> ::= start (<CondExp>) | end (<CondExp>)
<CondExp> ::= <SimpleCE> | [<CondExp>] <CondOp> <CondExp>
<SimpleCE> ::= <BooleanExp> | [ <EventExp> , <EventExp> )
<BooleanExp> ::=

Java Boolean Expression | <Exp> <CompOp> <Exp>
| [<BooleanExp>] <BoolOp> <BooleanExp>
<Exp> ::=
time (<EventExp>) | value (<EventExp>, <int>)
| any Java expression built from monitored objects & methods
<EventOp> ::= && | ||
<CondOp> ::= ! | && | ||
<BoolOp> ::= ! | && | ||
<CompOp> ::= < | <= | > | >= | == | !=
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Figure 5: BNF grammar for MEDL

is a rule for updation. For example, RaisingGate -> t = time (RaisingGate) says that
when the event RaisingGate happens, we set the auxilliary variable t to the time of this
event. Updates to auxilliary variables take place after the truth value of all events and
conditions has been determined. This means that if an event (or condition) is de ned using
an auxilliary variable, then the old value (or the value computed in the previous state) is
used to determine occurrence of the event.

De ning events and conditions. The primitive events and conditions in MEDL are

those that are de ned in PEDL. Besides these, primitive conditions can also be de ned
using boolean expressions using the auxilliary variables. Complex events and conditions
are built up using the connectives of the logic described in section 4.2. These events and
conditions are then used to de ne the safety properties and alarms.

Safety Properties and Alarms. The correctness of the system is described in terms

safety properties and alarms. Safety properties are conditions that must always be true
during the execution. Alarms, on the other hand, are events that must never be raised.
Note, that all safety properties [MP92] can be described in this way. Also observe that
alarms and safety properties are complementary ways of expressing requirement. Indeed,
the event corresponding to the safety property condition changing state from false to true
is an alarm. The reason we have both of them is for the convenience of the user, because
some properties are easier to think of in terms of conditions, while others are easier to think
of in terms of alarms.

4.5 Target System
As discussed at section 3.1, our monitoring approach is di erent from similar approaches
in the way instrumentation is done. The di erence is twofold. First, we instrument a low
level code directly rather than instrument high level code and re-compile it. Second, we
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instrument a program so that we can monitor variables continuously without missing any
updates of the variables. To support the above features, we chose Java bytecode as the
target implementation for monitored system monitoring.
The choice of Java bytecode for inmplementation does not commit us to Java as highlevel implementation language. "Java bytecode" for "Java" is like assembler code for
C/C++. As assembler code can be generated from any high-level languages including
C/C++, Java bytecode can be generated from many high-level languages. We use the term
"class le" indicating a le which contains a program written in Java bytecode.
The rationale of selecting target system written in Java bytecode is as follows. First, a
class le contains rich symbolic information of a program in constant pool which contains
all class names, method and eld type and name, exception names and ranges and type
information [LY97]. Given a monitoring script, we can automatically instrument a class le
with help of the information. Second, Java bytecode prohibits using pointers and is strongly
typed. A program written in Java bytecode makes it easier to monitor program variables
continuously than a program compiled from other conventional languages like C/C++. Let
us see this through example. Suppose we want to monitor integer variable x in main().
void main() {
int x = 3;
int *px = &x;
int px2 = px;
long px3 = px;
x ++;
(*px)++;
(*(int *)px2)++;
(*(int *)px3)++;

//
//
//
//

x
x
x
x

==
==
==
==

4
5
6
7

g(px);

// x == ?

}

As you see, x can be updated directly by variable name x or indirectly by pointer px.
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Even x can be updated through normal variable px2 of type int and px3 of type long. In
order to monitor one variable, we have to keep watching all other variables which can be
converted to pointer type in general. It causes heavy overhead at run-time. Furthermore,
pointer of x can be passed to another function g(). Although x is a variable declared in
main(), we have to keep track of execution of function g() too.
Java bytecode does not use pointers to primitive types. It makes monitoring of accessing
to variables of primitive type easy. Local variable x of primitive type can be updated
only through the name x and only inside of the method where it's declared. For global
variable( eld variable) x of primitive type can be updated only through the name x and
by methods which can access x following access modi er of x. Monitoring variables of a
non-primitive type (class type) is more complex than monitoring variables of primitive type,
because Java bytecode uses reference type for handling objects. Still, strong typing system
of Java bytecode makes monitoring non-primitive type easier than C/C++ (we will discuss
it at section 4.6.2)
As Java gains popularity, more systems will be implemented in Java. In addition,
there are many high-level languages, such as Ada and Lisp, that can be compiled into Java
bytecode [Tol], making use of platform-neutral and well-designed structure of Java bytecode.
Thus, choosing target system written in Java bytecode allows us to apply our methodology
to a wide variety of systems.

4.6 Issues in MaC prototype
MaC prototype monitors a property which is a composition of assertions of the form \thread
T updates object O to value V using method M " (we can omit references to the thread,
the method, or the value of the object from the assertion when they are irrelevant). The
composition can be done by temporal, boolean, conditional operators. MaC prototype can
monitor well-known properties, including safety, temporal and fault-tolerance properties
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(see Section 5). For example, in a railroad crossing speci cation, we can describe a safety
property as when a train reaches a crossing (i.e. a thread Train updates train x to 500
using method running()), the gate must be down (i.e. thread Gate has nished method
gd()).
For monitoring a property, a target system should be instrumented in such a way that
information about threads, values of objects and method invocations can be correctly extracted and passed to the monitor (see Section 4.7 for more detail). Thus main design issues
are


how to describe entities (i.e threads, objects, values and methods) of an assertion in
the monitoring script;



how to recognize the entities during the execution of the target system;



how to implement a correct mechanism for the recognition.

All the three issues are closely related to the language of target system. Below we discuss
each issue in detail.

4.6.1 Naming of Monitored Variables and Execution Points
When we specify variables to be monitored, we have to identify the variable by its name
and its static and dynamic environment explicitly.1 Because we want to monitor not only
class elds, but also local variables in a method, the object naming scheme includes method
names as well as object names. First, consider an example.
// Double linked list
class A {
int x;
A next, before;
A(int x) { this.x = x;}
1

We do not consider inner classes here.
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public static void main(String[] args) {
A a1 = new A(1), a2 = new A(2), a3 = new A(3);
a1.setLink(null,a2);
a2.setLink(a1,a3);
a3.setLink(a2,null);
a2.traverse();
}
void setLink(A b, A a) {
this.before = b;
this.after = a;
}
void traverse() {
A a = this;
for(int length = 0; a != null; length ++) {
System.out.println(a.x);
a = a.next
}
System.out.println("Length is " + length);
}
}

All object speci cations begin with a name in the scope of main() or init(). Suppose
we want to monitor length in method traverse of object a2;we specify this variable by
a2.traverse().length. Suppose we want to monitor the value of variable x in an object
that is being traversed from a2. We specify it as a2.traverse().a.x. For static variables
and methods, we use class name rather than object name. In addition, we can include a
name of a thread into the object speci cation. This is necessary to distinguish between local
variables of a method invoked concurrently in two threads. The followinf BNF describes
the syntax for monitored object naming speci cation2:
<VarName>
<VarName'>

= ( <ThreadID>, <VarName'>)
= <Var_of_main()>

This syntax is not complete in a sense that there can be some object which we can not distinguish from
others using this syntax. However, we prefer current syntax because of its simpleness than a complete and
complex syntax.
2
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| <VarName'>.<GlobalVarName>
| <VarName'>.<MethodNames>.<LocalVarName>
<MethodNames> = <MethodName> | <MethodNames>.<MethodName>

Here, <Var of main()> is a variable in the scope of main() and <MethodNames> is a sequence of nested method invocations.
Similarly, we name an execution point as a monitored entity.
<ExePoint>
<ExePoint'>

= ( <ThreadID>, <ExePoint'> )
= start of <VarName'>.<MethodName>
|
end of <VarName'>.<MethodName>

4.6.2 Object Oriented Monitoring
When we monitor the system as an evolving collection of objects, we face two diculties:
an aliasing problem and a reference changing problem. The following example explains the
problems and our approach to its solution.
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1: class A {
2:
int x;
3:
A(int x) { this.x = x;}
4:
5:
public static void main(String[] args) {
6:
A a1 = new A(1);
7:
A a3 = a1;
8:
A a2 = new A(2);
9:
10:
a3.x = 3;
11:
a2.swap(a1);
12:
a1 = a2;
13:
}
14:
15:
void swap(A a) {
16:
int tmp_x = a.x;
17:
a.x = this.x;
18:
this.x = a.x;
19:
}
20:}

On line 6, an object with eld x having value 1 is created with name a1. On line 7, it is
given another name a3, and on line 10 the object acquires still another name a4 in method
swap(). We refer to this as name aliasing. The reference changing problem is illustrated
on line 12. Name a1 does not refer the object created at line 6 anymore, but to a di erent
object created at line 8. Thus, to monitor an object correctly, we have to check all reference
variables which refer to the object. We can not know statically which references will refer
to an object. We have to check it at run-time by monitoring references which can refer to
the object. This task is made simpler by the fact that Java bytecode is strongly typed, that
is, a reference of type T can refer only to an object of type T. In order to handle aliases
to an object, the lter maintains a table that contains names of monitored variables and
addresses of corresponding objects. By checking value of every reference variable of type
T against the address of the object of type T, we can ensure that we monitor the object
without missing any updates, and that we monitor the correct object. In addition, we may
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have to keep a signature of a frame stack for monitoring local variables.

4.6.3 Atomicity of Variable Update Detection
We insert a probe of the lter immediately after storing instruction such as istore and
putfield. When a monitored variable is updated by storing instruction, a lter immediately sends information about the update, including the timestamp, to monitor. Based on
the timestamp, the event recognizer determines the order of updates (we assume that clock
synchronization is outside the scope of the problem). However, in a multi-threaded application, the order of updates may be determined incorrectly due to preemption by thread
scheduler. Consider the following example.
Thread 1

Thread 1

Thread 2

preemption istore x 10
by scheduler

istore x 10
send_update("x",10)
preemption
by scheduler

Thread 2

istore y 20
send_update("y",20)

preemption
by scheduler send_update("x",10)

istore y 20
send_update("y",20)

a) Expected Behavior

b) Incorrect Behavior

Figure 6: Incorrect ordering of event detection
As you see in Fig 6, update of x should be reported with an earlier timestamp than that
of update of y. But thread 1 is preempted just before reporting of update of x, and update
of y has earlier timestamp. Furthermore if thread 2 updates x too, the lter is left with an
erroneous view of the value of x.
There are two conceivable solutions for the problem. The rst one is to use two time
stamps. One will be assigned immediately before an update of a variable, the other immediately after the update. If the time interval between the two timestamps of update of
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overlaps with the interval between the timestamps of updating y, the event recognizer
detects that order of updates can be either way. However, this solution can not prevent the
latter problem when thread 2 updated value of x. The second solution is to use a global lock
for "send bu er" of a lter. A lter has a bu er for storing and sending update information.
Immediately before before and immediately after the storing instruction, we insert a lter
probe to acquire the lock and place update information into the bu er, and then release
the lock. This makes the update and its detection mechanism atomic. It causes overhead
of acquiring and releasing lock at run-time. However, it guarantees the correct detection of
order of updates and can be implemented simply using monitor. Therefore we choose the
second for update detection mechanism.
x

4.7 Filter and Code Instrumentation
A lter consists of a set of probes inserted into class les of the target system and a separate
lter object. The lter object is an instance of a class, which has methods for storing
information about updates and for communication between lter and event recognizer, a
table containing name and address of the monitored objects (see section 4.6.2), and a thread
to process updates. To minimize a system overhead, inserted probes just store updation
information in the bu er in the lter class. Checking a reference variable against the
address of the object and sending updation information is performed by the lter thread in
the background.
As discussed in section 3.1, we instrument a class le statically. We instrument the
system to detect changes of values in monitored variables and send these values. Let us
brie y describe how instrumentation works. The lter keeps watch over three program
entities; execution point, local variables and eld variables. We do not discuss thread
identi cation here.
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Instrumented System
Thread1

Thread2

Filter Thread
Name/Address Table

request_lock
request_lock
putfield a1.x 10
send_update("a1.x",10)
release_lock
putfield b1.y 20
send_update("b1.y",20)
release_lock

lock

a1.x
b1.y

...
...

var name b1.y
var value 20
timestamp 10250

Send to
Event Recognizer
a1.x
10
10245

Send buffer

Figure 7: Structure of Instrumented System

Execution point. The current prototype detects when the execution point reaches a

method invocation, returns from a method. The start and end of the program and exceptions within a method are also detected. Invocation and return from the method can be
detected by inserting the following bytecode before the rst instruction and after the last
instruction of the code for the method.
ldc "Execution Point"
ldc <ex_point>
invokestatic MAC/Filter/send(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)V

Instruction ldc loads a constant into operand stack. <ex point> is a string representation of start or end of a method, such as "Start of add(II)I", where I means
integer types for two parameters and return value. The last line invokes static method
MAC.Filter.send() of the lter class with two parameters "Execution Point" and
<ex point>. Other information about the update, such as thread name, timestamp, the
parent object, the signature of a frame stack are implicitly passed to the lter. The method
checks whether this update is related to the speci ed monitored entities or not, by looking
at the thread name, static environment given by a parent object and dynamic environment
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given by a signature of frame stack. Similarly, the start of the program is detected by inserting code at main() or init(). Ending of program can be detected by looking at invocation
exit() method and checking whether every thread except the daemon thread terminates.
An exception of a method can be detected by looking at the exception table. Every method
has its own exception table that contains names of exception and jump addresses for the
case when the exception occurs. We insert the above code at the jump address.

Local variable. Every local variable is indexed and accessed through this index which is

xed in bytecode instruction. The only instructions that update local variable are <T>store
<id> where <T> is type of local variable and <id> is the index of a local variable and iinc
<id>. Therefore, we can statically identify the places in the bytecode that update the local
variable of interest. Immediately after the updating instruction we insert the following code:
ldc <local_var_name>
<T>load id
invokestatic MAC/Filter/send(Ljava/lang/String;<T>)V

Field variable. Detecting a change in a eld variable is similar to detecting a change in a

local variable. The putfield operator has a reference to an object as a run-time parameter
and an index to the eld in that object as a xed parameter in bytecode. We can detect
changes of the eld variable by keeping watch on putfield operators and their reference
parameters.

Inserting code may cause side e ects in the monitored program. For example, the
instrumented program may use more resources such as heap, stack and constant pool than
the original program. It may a ect the scheduling of threads because the newly added code
consumes cpu time additionally. However, it seems very rare that a program exhausts all the
resource due to inserted code and abnormally halts. Furthermore, a sound multi-threaded
program depends on synchronization to guarantee correct execution.
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The lter is generated by a lter generator, which is implemented in Java using JTrek
library [Dig] for inserting code into the program. The lter generator takes a program
to be instrumented and list of monitored variables and monitored methods as input. It
generates an instrumented program as output by inserting probes at proper places of the
code. The lter sends timestamped messages containing the updated values through object
serialization [AG98], whenever it detects updates of any of the above three entities. To
minimize the overhead to the system, sending values to event recognizer through the network
is performed by a separate thread.

4.8 Event recognizer
The event recognizer needs to determine the truth or falsity of the events and conditions
de ned in the PEDL script, at all time instants. Assuming that the lter informs the event
recognizer whenever some object of interest changes or some monitored method is invoked,
the event recognizer needs to check the truth values at the times when it receives a message
from the lter. The event recognizer maintains, at all times, a table that stores the current
value for each monitored variable. Each message from the event recognizer causes this table
to be updated. For local variables whose value needs to be distinguished across method
invocation, we maintain a stack; each time the execution invokes the method in which this
variable is de ned, the new value of the variable is pushed onto the stack, and when the
execution returns from such a method invocation, the top element is popped from the stack.
Whenever the event recognizer gets an update from the lter, it evaluates the truth
of all events and conditions. Since conditions are de ned in terms boolean expressions
over monitored variables, they can be directly evaluated from the table storing the current
values of all monitored variables. However, in order to determine if an event like start(c)
is present it must not only know the current truth value of condition c, but also its truth
value at the time of the previous update. The same is true for the event end(c). Hence
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the checker also keeps track of the values of all the conditions at the time of the previous
update, in addition to the values of the monitored objects. Finally, once the checker has
determined the truth of all the conditions and events de ned in the PEDL script, it sends
to the checker the truth values of those events and conditions that have been \exported".

4.9 Run-time Checker
The run-time checker gets information about the truth of certain events and conditions
from the event recognizer. The checker then tries to see if the safety properties de ned
in the MEDL script are always true and that the alarms in the MEDL script are never
raised. The checker, as well as the event recognizer, determines the truth of the events and
conditions only at the times it gets a message from the event recognizer. To do this, the
checker maintains a table that stores the values of the auxilliary variables de ned in the
MEDL script. The checker also keeps track of the truth of events and conditions at the time
of the previous update. As we saw in the previous section, this is sucient to determine
the truth value of all events and conditions that do not involve the pairing operation. The
truth of the condition [e, f) can also be evaluated. The condition [e, f) is true now, if
either e is present now and f is not present now or, if [e, f) was true at the time of the
previous update and f is not present now.
Once all the truth of all the events and conditions has been determined, the auxilliary
variables are updated. If the event corresponding to the update rule is present is in the current time instant, then the auxilliary variable is updated as per the assignment. Whenever
an alarm becomes true or a safety property becomes false, the checker declares the program
to be incorrect.
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5 Examples
5.1 A Rail-Road Crossing System
The rst example illustrates how MaC framework is used for monitoring a safety-critical
system, based on the railroad crossing. This example is commonly used as a benchmark
in formal methods research [HD96]. There are three components in the system: a train, a
gate, and a controller. The goal of the system is to operate the crossing gate subject to
safety and utility properties. The safety property states that when a train is in the crossing,
the gate is down.
We de ne four events to check the safety requirement in PEDL. startIC means the
train reaches in the crossing. endIC means the train passes the crossing. startGD means
the gate enters the closed state. endGD means the gate starts raising. We de ne the safety
property written in MEDL using condition IC which means a train is in cross and GD which
means a gate is down. Figure 8 presents a monitoring script containing the de nitions of
these events and the safety property.
Let us brie y explain what the program variables mean. train x is the position of the
tail of a train. train length is the length of a train. Thus train x + train length yields
the position of the head of a train. cross x is the position of the left end of the crossing.
Thus cross x + cross length is the position of the right end of the crossing. Methos
Gate.gd() is used to lower the gate. Gate.gu() is the method for raising the gate.

5.2 A Database Client Example
Another example describes monitoring of a database client. The client in our example
periodically probes some database server (choosing it randomly from a list of servers) for
some information. The informal pseudo-code for the client appears in Figure 9. Some of
the requirements that one might be interested in monitoring for such a system are:
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MonScr RailRoadCrossing
export event startIC, endIC, startGD, endGD;
MonVarDcl :
float RRC.train_x;
int RRC.train_length;
int RRC.cross_x;
int RRC.cross_length;
MonMethodDcl:
Gate.gd();
Gate.gu();
CondDef:
Cond IC = RRC.train_x + RRC.train_length > RRC.cross_x &&
RRC.train_x <= RRC.cross_x + RRC.cross_length;
EventDef:
Event startIC = start(IC);
Event endIC = end(IC);
Event startGD = end_m(Gate.gd());
Event endGD = start_m(Gate.gu());
End
ReqSpec RailRoadCrossing
import event startIC, endIC, startGD, endGD;
CondDef:
Cond IC = [startIC, endIC];
Cond GD = [startGD, endGD];
SafePropDef:
SafeProp safeRRC = IC -> GD;
End

Figure 8: Monitoring script for the railroad crossing

42

Client:
loop periodically (every p time units do)
randomly select a URL location url from a given list
open an HTTP connection to url with a timeout of To
if connection is established do
repeat for R times or until successful
send a CGI query for data
successful <- response from server within d units of time
if unsuccessful use old data
else use the data just received
else use old data
process data
endloop

Figure 9: Informal description of the Database Client example
RT The client is indeed periodic, i.e., every p units of time it tries to query a new server.
FT If the processed data is old, then either a connection to the chosen server could not
be opened or the client could not get a response to the query, even after R retries.
A sample Java implementation of the client, according to the pseudo-code above, is
given in Appendix. The corresponding monitoring script is given in Figure 10. The events
to detect in the monitoring script are the start of a period (periodStart), the start of
an attempt to establish a connection to a server (conStart), the failure of an attempt to
establish a connection (conFail), the resending of a query (queryResend), and the event
of old data being used during processing (oldData). Using these events we can check the
properties RT and FT described above. The properties RT and FT are formally speci ed in
the corresponding MEDL script in Figure 11. The checker counts the number of times the
query was resent since the begining of the period, using the auxiliary variable numRetries.
The duration of the last period is stored in the variable periodTime, and the start time of
the previous period is stored in the variable lastPeriodStart. The variable chkConFail
is used to check if the connection did indeed fail during this period.
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MonScr DBMon
export event periodStart, conStart, conFail, queryResend,
oldData;
MonitoredObjects:
int dbc.getData(BufferedReader).r;
long dbc.run().startTime;
Object dbc.oldData;
MonitoredMethods:
void ct.ConnectTry (string, int);
Socket ct.result ();
Object dbc.getData();
EventDef:
event periodStart = update(dbc.run().startTime);
event conStart = startM(ct.ConnectTry);
event queryResend =
update(dbc.getData(BufferedReader).r);
event oldData = start(value(endM(dbc.getData())) != dbc.oldData);
event conFail = start(value(endM(ct.ConnectTry.result)) == null);
End

Figure 10: PEDL script for the database client
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ReqSpec DBReq
import event periodStart, conStart, conFail, queryResend,
oldData;
AuxilliaryVariables:
long periodTime;
long lastPeriodStart;
int numRetries;
boolean chkConFail;
SafetyProperties:
property periodic = (periodTime == p);
Alarms:
alarm wrongFT = oldData && ((numRetries < R) || !(chkConFail));
AuxVarDef:
initial -> periodTime = p;
lastPeriodStart = 0;
numRetries = 0;
chkConFail = false;
periodStart -> periodTime = time(periodStart) - lastPeriodStart;
lastPeriodStart = time(periodStart);
numRetries = 0;
conStart -> chkConFail = false;
conFail -> chkConFail = true;
queryResend -> numRetries = numRetries + 1;
End

Figure 11: Requirements for the database client
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Figure 12: The hexagonal pattern of MAVs

5.3 An avionics example
One more example of the utility of MaC approach is taken from a very important domain of
modern warfare. Micro air vehicles (MAV), small unmanned planes that can be dispatched
in large quantities very quickly (e.g., dropped from another aircraft), can be employed to
perform many di erent tasks. One such task involves arranging MAVs into a hexagonal
pattern, illustrated in Figure 12. Each MAV has to be near a grid of the pattern; several
MAV's can occupy the same grid point (this is, clearly, a two-dimensional view of a threedimensional situation). Control of individual MAVs from a centralized controller is not
feasible, therefore the MAVs must form the pattern through communications with their
neighbours, using local information only. Gordon and Speers at NRL [Gor88a] devised a
distributed algorithm to solve this problem. The algorithm is based on relative positions of
the neighbors of an MAV.
The goal of this example is to demonstrate how monitoring and checking can be used to
observe whether the desired pattern is forming as expected. The approach to monitoring is
based on the observation that in the hexagonal pattern, each neighbor of an MAV is either
at a xed distance that is the parameter of the pattern (adjacent grid point), or very close
to the MAV in question (same grid point). If the pattern is not fully formed, there are
MAVs that have heighbors in other locations, and this can be detected as a violations of
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the pattern. Intuitively, we should expect that as the pattern forms, the number of such
violations should go down.
An implementation-independent MEDL speci cation of this property is shown in Figure 13. The primitive event MAValert, supplied by the event recognizer, denotes a misplacement of some neighbor of an MAV. Auxiliary variable currCount is used in the checker to
count the number of violations of the pattern in the current interval. When the interval
elapses, the accumulated number is compared with the number of violations in the previous
interval. If a signi cant increase in the number of violations is detected, an alarm NoPattern
is sent to the user as a noti cation of potential problems with the pattern formation.
This monitoring approach is applied to a distributed emulator of MAV deployment,
implemented in Java. Each MAV is represented as a separate instance of class MAV, based
on standard Java class Thread. When the thread in an MAV is run, it continuously executes
the positioning algorithm and queries its neighbours for their positions. A local variable
distance in the run() method of the class is used to hold the distance from the currently
queried neighbor. The monitoring script for this implementation is shown in Figure 14. It
de nes event MAValert that is delivered to the checker. The event is de ned in terms of the
value of the variable distance. By declaring the variable as a monitored entity, he script
instructs the lter to send all updates of this variable to the event recognizer which, in turn,
compares them with the acceptable range of values as described in the script.

6 Conclusions and Future work
We propose a monitoring and checking architecture as a framework for run-time assurance.
It is bridging a gap between the traditional two approaches, static veri cation and testing.
We use ACSR and Java as our design and implementation language and mechanically
instrument the target system on the bytecode level. To make run-time assurance monitoring
convincing, we should provide formal guarantee of the requirement property at run-time,
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ReqSpec HexPattern
import event MAValert;
Auxiliary Variables :
long currInterval;
int currCount;
int prevCount;
Alarm Definitions :
Alarm NoPattern = (currCount > prevCount + 5) && (prevCount != -1)
Auxiliary Variable Definitions:
start(true) ->
currInterval := System.currentTimeMillis()
currCount := 0;
prevCount := -1
System.currentTimeMillis() > currInterval + 3000 ->
currInterval := currInterval + 3000;
prevCount := currCount;
currCount := 0
MAValert ->
currCount++
End

Figure 13: Requirement speci cation for pattern monitoring
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MonScr MAVpattern
export event MAValert;
Monitored Entities :
double MAV.run().distance
Event Definitions :
Event tooClose = (distance > 0.25*R) && (distance < 0.75*R);
Event tooFar = (distance > 1.25*R) && (distance < 1.5*R);
Event MAValert = tooClose || tooFar
End

Figure 14: PEDL script for pattern monitoring
which we did not fully investigate yet. We intend to incorporate process algebraic techniques
for reasoning about concurrency and communication, and program checking for numerical
calculations into our monitoring approach.
We are investigating a number of issues that deal with extension of MAC architecture to
distributed monitoring. For example, in a distributed environment, we have to capture the
global state based on information from local monitors only. We think instrumentation of the
Java virtual machine can help distributed monitoring to obtain proper timing information
about threads and communications within the system. We performed experiments using
a multiple reader-writer example and have some theoretical results on distributability of
monitor.
Another interesting question is about gap between the abstraction provided by a computation model of a speci cation language and the real program. Most of formal speci cation
languages have an ideal model which might not t into the real program. The question
here is how to compare abstract executions of the speci cation and concrete runs of the
monitored system and adjust the conclusions drawn from the monitoring process to account
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for this kind of di erence.
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A Java implementation of Database Client
import java.io.*;
import java.net.*;
class DBClient extends Thread{
URL[] urlList;
int numUrls;
int period;
int conTimeout;
int queryTimeout;
int retry;
int retryDelay;

53

Object data ;
Object oldData;
Socket sock;
DBClient(String[] urlList, int numUrls, int period, int conTimeout,
int queryTimeout, int retry, int retryDelay) {
int port= 0;
URL u = null;
this.numUrls = numUrls;
this.period = period;
this.conTimeout = conTimeout;
this.queryTimeout = queryTimeout;
this.retry = retry;
this.retryDelay = retryDelay;
this.urlList = new URL[256];
for(int i=0; i < numUrls; i++) {
try{
this.urlList[i] = new URL(urlList[i]);
} catch(MalformedURLException e) {
System.err.println(e);
}
}
start();
}
/**
* Main function gets file of URLs and parameters and passes all to
* instance of DBClient
*/
public static void main(String[] args) {
BufferedReader br = null;
String line = null;
String[] urlList = new String[256];
DBClient dbc = null;
int numUrls = 0;
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// Get url list file
if( args.length != 6) {
System.err.println("Usage: java DBClient url_list " +
"period connection_timeout read_timeout retry retry_delay");
System.exit(1);
}
// Get url list file
try {
br = new BufferedReader( new FileReader(args[0]));
} catch( FileNotFoundException e) {
System.err.println(e);
System.exit(1);
}
// Read url list file
do {
try {
line = br.readLine();
if ( line != null) {
urlList[numUrls++] = line;
}
} catch( IOException e) {
System.err.println(e);
}
} while( line != null );
// Run DBClient
dbc = new DBClient(urlList, numUrls, Integer.parseInt(args[1]),
Integer.parseInt(args[2]), Integer.parseInt(args[3]),
Integer.parseInt(args[4]), Integer.parseInt(args[5]));
}
/**
* Main procedure of DBClient
*/
public void run()
{
BufferedReader in = null;
PrintWriter out = null;
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long startTime = 0;
int index = 0;
/* Test
for(int i=0; i < numUrls; i++)
System.out.println( urlList[i]);
*/
// Send query and receive data periodically
while(true) {
startTime = System.currentTimeMillis();
try {
System.err.println("----------------------------------------------");
index = connect(); // Fault tolerrant connection
sock.setSoTimeout(queryTimeout);// Set timeout for receiving data
in = new BufferedReader (new InputStreamReader(
sock.getInputStream()));
out = new PrintWriter(new OutputStreamWriter(
sock.getOutputStream()));
// Send query to URL
out.println("GET " + urlList[index].getFile());
out.flush();
System.err.println("Query sent :" + "GET " + urlList[index]);
// Receive data from the URL
data = getData(in);
System.err.println("Data received :" + data);
oldData = data;
process(data);
// Close the connection
in.close();
out.close();
sock.close();
sleep(period - (System.currentTimeMillis() - startTime));
} catch( InterruptedException e) {
System.err.println(e);
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} catch( IllegalArgumentException e1) {
System.err.println(e1);
} catch( UnknownHostException e) {
System.err.println(e);
} catch( IOException e) {
System.err.println(e);
}
}
}
int connect() {
String url = null;
String host = null;
int port = 0;
int index= 0;
ConnectTry ct = null;
// Select random url and read content from the url.
while(true) {
index = (int)(Math.random() * numUrls);// 0 <= randome
host = urlList[index].getHost();
port = urlList[index].getPort();
port = (port == -1) ? 80 :port;
ct = new ConnectTry(host,port);
try {
ct.join(conTimeout);
if( ct.result() == null) {
System.err.println("Connection timeout(" + conTimeout
+ ") to " + urlList[index]);
ct.interrupt();
continue;
}
else {
sock = ct.result();
}
break;
} catch( InterruptedException e) {
}
}
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< 1

return index;
}
Object getData(BufferedReader in) {
int r = 0;
while( r < retry) {
try{
data = in.readLine();
oldData = data;
return data;
} catch(InterruptedIOException e) {
System.err.println("Query Timeout(" + queryTimeout+
") happen!");
try{ sleep( retryDelay);}
catch(Exception e2) {}
r ++;
} catch(IOException e3) {}
}
System.err.println("Old data is used due to max query failure" );
return oldData;
}

Object process(Object o) {
return null;
}
}
class ConnectTry extends Thread {
Socket s;
String host;
int port;
ConnectTry(String host,int port) {
this.host = host;
this.port = port;
start();
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}
public Socket result() {
return s;
}
public void run() {
try{
s = new Socket(host,port);
if( this.currentThread().isInterrupted() ) {
s.close();
}
}
catch(InterruptedIOException e) { }
catch( SocketException e) {System.err.println(e);}
catch(UnknownHostException e) {System.err.println(e);}
catch(IOException e) { System.err.println(e);}
}
}
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